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Abstract
Online streaming services are challenging long-standing decision-making processes 
in the traditional motion picture industry, thus placing Hollywood major studios at 
a crossroads. We use the institutional logics perspective to examine how both tradi-
tional studios and online streaming services make strategic decisions on which films 
to produce and how these films are to be distributed. We then apply scenario analysis 
to explore how their interaction will likely evolve. We argue that the key criteria that 
studio executives use to make production and distribution decisions are shaped by 
what we define as a commitment institutional logic: decision-making heuristics that 
focus their attention on theatrical release and box-office intakes. In contrast, online 
streaming services follow a convenience institutional logic, the product of advanced 
data analytics to increase subscriptions. In the convenience institutional logic, the 
need to drive online traffic by providing users with an extensive catalogue of movies 
guides film production and distribution decisions. Whereas the commitment logic 
aims for mass-market hits in cinemas, the convenience logic seeks to reach a wide 
range of subscribers at home with micro-segmented offerings. We compare the two 
logics, develop four scenarios of how the interaction between them may shape the 
film industry, and offer recommendations.
Keywords Hollywood studio · Streaming service · Institutional logic · Scenario 
analysis · Decision-making · Film production and distribution
1 Introduction
For almost 100 years, the Hollywood studios ruled the global film industry. They 
did not always produce the most critically acclaimed films, nor did they dominate in 
every country. Even so, their market power and box-office returns were unassailable. 
Lately however, new online content providers have been challenging the continuing 
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power of the five major Hollywood studios still in operation—that is, Warner Bros. 
Entertainment, Paramount Pictures, Universal Pictures, Sony Pictures Entertain-
ment, and (after their merger took effect on 20 March 2019) Walt Disney Studios—
21st Century Fox. Prominent streaming services Netflix and Amazon Studios both 
engage in multi-billion-dollar investments in content production and appropriate 
most of the value derived from the shift in global consumer spending from theatrical 
(from 36.4 billion USD in 2014 to 41.1 billion USD in 2018) to home entertainment 
(from 15.8 billion USD in 2014 to 42.6 billion USD in 2018: MPAA 2019). Such 
systemic changes have led to the contention that “Hollywood is in the midst of a 
full-blown identity crisis”.1
The identity crisis facing Hollywood is not simply one of an alternative technol-
ogy eroding its dominance, as was the case in the 1950s when television broadcast-
ing emerged. Rather, a new set of players, online streaming services, are overtly 
challenging how Hollywood does business. In this article, we contend that to under-
stand this challenge, it is important to contrast the organizing practices (that is, rou-
tines and procedures) of the studios with those of the online streaming services. We 
argue that these organizing practices and the decision-making criteria they give rise 
to are manifestations of “institutional logics”, defined as: “the formal and informal 
rules of action, interaction, and interpretation that guide and constrain decision mak-
ers in accomplishing the organization’s tasks” (Thornton and Ocasio 1999: 804). 
Online streaming services pose a challenge to the institutional logic that governs 
the studios’ decision-making processes. These digital players offer, in contrast to the 
studios, subscription packages (e.g. Netflix, Amazon Prime, Apple TV+) and single 
film deals (e.g. Amazon Video, Apple iTunes).2 They follow a different institutional 
logic and consequently use a different set of organizing practices and decision crite-
ria when developing film projects and making distribution decisions. The core ques-
tion we seek to address is the following: How will the competition between the two 
institutional logics, one well established and the other new, develop?
The article is structured as follows. The next section introduces the institutional 
logics theoretical framework. We then proceed to define the two alternative log-
ics that are currently shaping the production and distribution of films. The first, 
which we label “commitment logic”, is the traditional “theatrical release” (that is, 
the screening of a movie in a cinema) logic of the five Hollywood major studios. 
The second, which we call “convenience logic”, is manifest in the digital libraries 
and subscription models implemented by newer entrants such as Netflix, Amazon 
Studios, and Apple TV+. After comparing how the five studios and their digital 
rivals implement both institutional logics, we turn our attention to the develop-
ment of alternative scenarios: in particular, scenarios in which the two logics are 
1 Barnes, B. (2019). A Year after #MeToo, Hollywood’s Got a Malaise Money Can’t Cure. The New 
York Times, 11 11 2018: BU1.
2 Other digital platforms, including YouTube, Snapchat and TikTok, also vie for audiences’ attention 
online. Inasmuch as they primarily rely on home-made user-generated content (and in the case of the 
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complementary, and others where they compete with, or become substitutes for, one 
another.
We argue that complementary logics scenarios would reduce the threat to the stu-
dios, who would then be able to continue to use digital players as outlets to stream 
their films after their initial cinema release, and to partner with them to produce 
and release content both in cinemas and online. Alternatively, competing logics 
scenarios increase the likelihood of one logic dominating the other. Domination 
by the commitment logic would result in traditional studios acquiring or develop-
ing online streaming services. We already see evidence of such actions, with the 
launch of Disney+ in November 2019 and of WarnerMedia’s and NBCUniversal’s 
bespoke streaming services in 2020. Alternatively, domination by the convenience 
logic would lead to upstream vertical integration of digital players into traditional 
studios, as they increasingly seek to expand their portfolios of intellectual property 
assets and content and to control production facilities. Such integration has also 
started, with Netflix’s October 2018 acquisition of Albuquerque production studio 
ABQ3 and deal to set up a permanent UK production hub at Shepperton Studios 
from October 2019.4 Last, a scenario of logics substitution could lead to the obso-
lescence of the two existing logics and the emergence of a new one. We discuss four 
scenarios articulating these alternatives and offer recommendations to the studios 
and streaming services. We close the article with our main conclusions and sugges-
tions for further research.
2  Theoretical overview
Across the fields of economics and management, extant research has utilized a 
variety of approaches to explain industry evolution, firm strategy, and managerial 
decision-making. Notably, scholars have used industrial economics to explain indus-
try dynamics (Porter 1980, 1985), business models to explain firm strategy (Ches-
brough 2010), and mental models to make sense of managers’ decision-making 
patterns (Senge 1990; Weick 1995). The institutional logics perspective of strategic 
decision-making rejects such explanatory segregation. Instead, it proposes a multi-
level model that allows for a more comprehensive understanding of observed behav-
iour by combining industry evolution, internal organizational processes, and mana-
gerial cognition.
At the macro-level, institutional logics shape organizing practices that direct and 
focus the attention of decision-makers (Thornton 2001) on the main production and 
distribution issues. Institutional logics at firm-level structure practices and routines 
that studio executives and other organizational actors use to gather information, 
3 https ://editi on.cnn.com/2018/10/08/media /netfl ix-albuq uerqu e-produ ction -studi o/index .html. Accessed 
10 10 2018.
4 Sweeney, M. (2019). Netflix Strikes Production Deal with Shepperton Studios. The Guardian, 03 07 
2019, https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/media /2019/jul/03/netfl ix-strik es-produ ction -deal-with-shepp erton 
-studi os. Accessed 09 11 2019.
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conduct analyses (including market and financial), and map future actions. At the 
micro-level, institutional logics define cognitive schemata as mental models or heu-
ristics that are the product of interaction between institutional logics and organiz-
ing practices at the macro-level (Ocasio 1997; Thornton 2004: 70). These cognitive 
representations of relationships between actions and consequences guide strategic 
decision-making and reveal themselves as criteria that studio executives and other 
organizational actors use to legitimize their decisions to each other and to external 
stakeholders and audiences.
Once established, the rules and symbols of an institutional logic are internalized, 
and other logics are perceived as either useless or irrelevant (Haveman and Gualtieri 
2017). Schemata usually give rise to “vocabularies of practice”—that is, “systems 
of labelled categories used by members of a social collective to make sense of and 
construct organizing practices” (Thornton et  al. 2012: 159). These linguistic cor-
relates reinforce the legitimacy and taken-for-granted character of institutional log-
ics, notably by structuring individual cognition and facilitating the social context 
of the decision-making process. Inasmuch as they serve as “critical linchpins that 
link symbolic representations with field-level practices” (Thornton et al. 2012: 168), 
vocabularies of practice bridge the routines and procedures that are institutional-
ized at the macro- and firm level with individual cognition at the micro-level. They 
explain how the cognitive diversity of individual decision-makers can produce con-
sistent managerial regularities at the industry and organizational level.
Institutional logics research suggests that decision-makers are slow to abandon 
organizing practices when performance declines. Such inertia is the result of strong 
taken-for-granted assumptions governing the relationship between decisions and 
their consequences. Routinized over time through repeated practice, these assump-
tions become embedded within institutional logics—ultimately defining what con-
stitutes rational action in a given context. Actors that seek to achieve certain objec-
tives, for instance maximizing returns on investment, are provided with ready-made 
options from which they select actions that meet desirable performance criteria. This 
extends not only to criteria used for setting revenue and profit targets, but also to the 
evaluation of performance relative to preset targets. Thus, institutional logics for a 
legal firm typically stipulate billable hours as a performance yardstick, and business 
schools are particularly sensitive to program rankings.
Similarly, if institutional logics shape managerial attention at the individual and 
organizational levels through mental models, assumptions, and values, then vocabu-
laries of practice provide stability to this attention focus, often to the point of rigid-
ity. They are used both formally and informally, in public deliberations and private 
discussion. Broadly speaking, they serve two roles. First, they provide individuals 
with the categories by which they can make sense of the world. In academia, for 
instance, “tenure”, “teaching load”, and “research portfolio” function as vocabular-
ies of practice. Second, they serve as tools of justification during decision-making to 
legitimize preferences and support a proposed course of action (Tilly 2006). In this 
respect, they are part of the social process that underpins strategic decision-making. 
The two roles are inseparable, with one inevitably reinforcing the other: The more 
individuals use vocabularies of practice as tools to communicate and justify their 
217
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views, the more they embed vocabularies of practice as categories that shape indi-
vidual cognition.
3  A tale of two institutional logics: commitment versus convenience
Let us now turn to the “taken-for-granted resilient social prescriptions” (Greenwood 
et al. 2010: 521) that define the institutional logics of Hollywood studios and online 
streaming services (respectively). We note that although all studios and streaming 
services operate under one or the other institutional logic, variations exist in the 
manifestations of the two logics as practices and decision-making criteria as well 
as in the schemata and vocabularies of practice across organizations, depending on 
their culture and history (Haveman and Gualtieri 2017). Table  1 provides a sim-
plified overview of the key attributes of the two institutional logics detailed below. 
First, we examine the “commitment” institutional logics of the five studios that con-
stitute the core of the Hollywood film industry.
The commitment institutional logic emerged in the early years of the twentieth 
century, from a close alignment between the feature film—the industry’s main prod-
uct—and the movie theatre as the venue in which the feature film is experienced and 
consumed (Bowser 1990). Since then, the tight coupling of feature film and movie 
theatre has framed studio executives’ attention and shaped their organizational prac-
tices. As organizations, Hollywood studios primarily deal with two key decision 
areas: what films should be produced, and how these films should be distributed 
(Gomery 1986—the Appendix provides a short historical overview of the evolution 
in time of the commitment institutional logic, starting with the opening of the first 
nickelodeon theatre in Pittsburgh in 1905).
While the organizing practices and criteria that executives use to decide what 
films should be produced and how these films should be distributed have evolved 
over time, the most prevalent among them became internalized in the studios long 
before they came under the control of larger publicly traded corporations (Simon-
ton 2009). Decisions made during film development and production are explicitly 
oriented towards theatrical release. Over time, studios developed schemata that 
regulate the organizational practices underpinning this process: starting with scripts 
and casting, budgets, the choice of production personnel, and approach to market-
ing (Ainslie et al. 2005; Basuroy et al. 2006). Nowadays, while the studios finance 
and release feature films, production relies on mobilizing largely outsourced crea-
tive resources (producers, artists, and technicians) on a film-by-film basis (Miller 
and Shamsie 1996). Mass media promotion designed to attract as much attention 
from potential audiences as is possible, as soon as possible, accompanies theatrical 
release. The goal is to create box-office momentum upon release that translates into 
a profitable theatrical run (Lampel and Shamsie 2000): as a movie delivers high ini-
tial (opening weekend) attendance, it should attract media attention and favourable 
word-of-mouth, which in turn should generate more attendance over the long run, 
and demand for the film in other distribution channels such as video-on-demand—
including digital streaming.
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The commitment institutional logic therefore directs a studio’s resources to the 
challenges associated with successful theatrical release, starting with maximizing 
initial attendance by persuading audiences to commit to spending time and money 
to what is intrinsically an unpredictable experience. Audiences cannot know in 
advance how much satisfaction, if any, they will derive from watching a specific 
movie (Neelamegham and Jain 1999; Walls 2008). Persuading consumers that 
the experience is worth their effort involves not only motivating them to make the 
resource commitment needed to go to a cinema instead of taking advantage of the 
plentiful entertainment alternatives available from the comfort of their home, but 
also to incur search costs when evaluating alternative film offerings and buy tick-
ets—frequently not just for themselves, but also on behalf of friends, partners, or 
family.
The commitment institutional logic, with its focus on attracting audiences to cin-
emas, is ultimately a race to capture consumers’ attention before (Jowett 1985) and 
during a movie’s theatrical run (Hennig-Thureau et al. 2006; Sawhney and Eliash-
berg 1996). The emergence of “movie stars” soon after large studios began to domi-
nate Hollywood was a recognition by studio CEOs of the importance of attracting 
audience attention to their films (Bass 1994). Studio CEOs initially resisted giving 
actors special billing. This changed once they realized that movie stars were the sur-
est way of getting audiences to choose which films they wanted to watch (Carrillat 
et al. 2018; Chang and Ki 2005; Neelamegham and Chintagunta 1999). Alongside 
the casting of movie stars, studios also invested heavily in sets, special effects, and 
stories. The resulting increase in budgets reinforced the commitment institutional 
logic. Getting large audiences into movie theatres fast became essential, and scarce 
resources were ploughed into movies designed to attract maximum attention from 
audiences and critics (Ravid 1999).
In the commitment institutional logic, terms such as “opening weekend” (that is, 
the first weekend box-office revenue of a film), “slate” (the portfolio of films pro-
duced or distributed by a studio in a given year), “creative producer” (a producer 
who actively contributes to creative decisions with the director and screenwriter), 
“direct-to-video” (a denomination that goes to films that are not deemed good or 
bankable enough to be released in movie theatres, and are therefore released straight 
to DVD and Blu-Ray), “above the line” (typically, the producer, screenwriter, direc-
tor, and lead actors), and “film release window” became the vocabularies of practice 
that framed attention and shaped organizing practices.
Theatrical release has been central to the commitment institutional logic for over 
a century, from the first nickelodeon in 1905 to the movie palaces of the 1920s and 
today’s cineplexes. It defines what filmmakers, the film industry, and wider society 
consider “cinema” to be, prompting director Steven Spielberg to state: “I want to see 
the survival of movie theaters. I want the theatrical experience to remain relevant 
in our culture”.5 Other prominent industry players seem to agree on the primacy of 
theatrical release. According to Cannes Film Festival director Thierry Fremaux, “for 
a film to become part of history, it must go through theaters, box office, the critics, 
5 Barnes, B. (2019). Ban Netflix from the Oscars? The New York Times, 25 04 2019: B1.
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the passion of cinephiles, awards campaigns, books, directories, filmographies. The 
collective discussion in cafes, in theaters, on the radio. All this is part of a tradition 
on which the history of film is based […] the history of cinema and the history of 
the internet is not the same thing”.6
Exclusivity rules have long defined the relationship between theatrical release 
and other distribution channels, such as DVD and video-on-demand. Reluctance to 
compromise on the 90-day exclusivity rule typically in place for blockbuster releases 
has led leading exhibitors to boycott Netflix movies, including Cary Joji Fukunaga’s 
“Beast of No Nation” (2015), Alfonso Cuaron’s Academy Award winner “Roma” 
(2018), and Martin Scorsese’s “The Irishman” (2019). The Hollywood studios 
feared that agreeing to reduce the 90-day window could set a precedent that would 
hurt box-office revenues, and compromise the likelihood of other films getting a cin-
ema release. From 2018 onward, movies selected for the Cannes Film Festival also 
have to commit to being distributed in French cinemas, which under French law, 
effectively prohibits them from appearing on a streaming platform for 3 years after 
their theatrical release.7 This new rule disqualified de facto “Roma” in 2018 and 
“The Irishman” in 2019 from being considered for Cannes.8
The emergence of Netflix, Amazon Studios, Apple TV+, and other online ser-
vices that stream content directly to consumers ushered a new institutional logic into 
film production and distribution, and drove a wedge with traditional industry stake-
holders. Near-limitless online storage capabilities allow for large film catalogues that 
consumers can access at their convenience, in what came to be called “ATAWAD”—
an acronym that stands for AnyTime, AnyWhere, and on Any Device, including 
tablets, phones, personal computers, or smart TVs. The reach of online streaming 
services is global. Netflix, for instance, typically produces content in numerous lan-
guages and locations and simultaneously releases it in the 190 countries in which 
the service operates (Aguiar and Waldfogel 2018). In contrast to the commitment 
logic, in this alternative “convenience institutional logic”, travelling to a bespoke 
place of consumption becomes unnecessary, and hundreds of options readily avail-
able on the streaming services’ homepages reduce user search costs to a minimum 
(Gomez-Uribe and Hunt 2015).
Online streaming services give consumers access to films both produced and 
commissioned in-house and by traditional studios. They use data analytics to pro-
duce and recommend movies, thereby micro-targeting specific groups of consum-
ers upstream and facilitating user search at the point of consumption (Gomez-Uribe 
and Hunt 2015). Online subscription models, in particular, lower switching costs 
6 Keslassy, E. (2018). Thierry Fremaux Explains Fest’s Thinking on Red Carpet Selfie Ban, Netflix 
Policy and #MeToo. Variety, 23 03 2018, https ://varie ty.com/2018/film/news/canne s-film-festi val-thier 
ry-frema ux-red-carpe t-selfi es-12027 35264 /. Accessed 17 01 2019.
7 Seth, R. (2019). Netflix vs. Hollywood: The Fight to Define the Future of Film. Vogue: Paris Edition, 
25 03 2019, https ://www.vogue .fr/fashi on-cultu re/artic le/netfl ix-vs-holly wood-the-fight -to-defin e-the-
futur e-of-film. Accessed 05 05 2019.
8 Thaddeus-Jones, J. (2019). Netflix v Cannes: Inside the Battle for the Future of Cinema. Financial 
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by giving consumers the ability to browse through libraries before viewing films in 
their entirety.
Initially, the film  catalogues of online streaming services consisted almost 
entirely of studio movies. Studios saw online streaming as an additional release win-
dow, not fundamentally different from pay-per-view or television, which they could 
exploit to compensate for the decline in DVD revenue in the early 2000s. They did 
not realize then that streaming would further reduce DVD sales and rentals. Just as 
they did in the 1950s when first threatened by television, the studios tried to subordi-
nate streaming to the commitment institutional logic by imposing strict release win-
dows across channels, with theatrical release, which they still regard as crucial for 
generating the publicity needed to attract consumers, coming first. The studios allow 
streaming services to keep a relatively small cut of the revenues generated online by 
their film and television proprietary content, and point to the substantial marketing 
costs associated with theatrical release to justify this revenue sharing model. Some 
online film providers, including Netflix and Amazon, have decided to move beyond 
acting as little more than alternate distribution channel for the studios. They have 
started producing and commissioning content themselves, in effect taking on the 
film development role of the studios.
Online streaming services change the relationship between consumers and dis-
tributors by replacing commitment with convenience. The convenience logic frees 
consumers from leaving their home to watch films in movie theatres. It also offers 
more expansive creative opportunities by liberating filmmakers from the feature film 
format (that is, the requirement of a running time of about 90 min, long enough for a 
fully developed cinematic narrative, but short enough for the movie to allow theatres 
to screen a feature film at least twice during the lucrative evening exhibition sched-
ule), and allowing them to experiment with more varied narrative forms, including 
shorter films and episodic content. Such flexibility is apparent in the latter, which is 
no longer constrained to set episode numbers and length, and may vary depending 
on the nature of the story and viewing experience. For instance, Netflix’s December 
2018 “Bandersnatch” Black Mirror episode, which offers viewers several alterna-
tive narrative options throughout, lasts between 40 and 90  min depending on the 
different paths the story takes,9 and episodes of the 2019 fourth season of Netflix’s 
“Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt” vary in running time from 22 to 53 min.10,11
The convenience institutional logic also frees online film providers from reliance 
on stars and the constant search for blockbusters. In contrast, the proliferation of 
ATAWAD content on the 271 streaming services available in the USA alone and 
the decrease in prices of large flat-screen monitors are forcing studios operating 
9 https ://www.indep enden t.co.uk/arts-enter tainm ent/tv/news/black -mirro r-bande rsnat ch-endin gs-how-to-
watch -all-five-what-happe ns-netfl ix-a8703 326.html. The Independent, 02 01 2019. Accessed 23 01 2019.
10 https ://www.imdb.com/title /tt333 9966/. Accessed 23 01 2019.
11 As Chavda (2018) points out, this flexibility extends to the commissioning of new shows. Streaming 
services do not face broadcasting capacity constraints, and the more shows they offer, the more likely 
they are to attract new subscribers. Most streaming services are also free from the traditional networks’ 
reliance on advertising revenues, and consequently tend to commit to straight-to-series orders rather than 
experiment with, and overinvest in, the staged development of a handful of pilots only into full series.
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under the commitment logic to sustain theatrical attendance by focusing even more 
resources on developing tentpole movies. Cinema ticket prices have increased since 
2010, so nowadays, “A movie has to feel like an event. Otherwise, people say, ‘Ehh, 
let’s just watch Netflix’”.12
The risks that attend the commitment logic—spending on blockbusters, and mov-
ies featuring stars that attract audiences into cinemas but appropriate substantial 
portion of box-office revenues (De Vany and Walls 1999; Faulkner and Anderson 
1987; Ravid 1999)—are largely eliminated in the convenience logic under which 
streaming services operate. When betting on box-office hits ceases to be the driv-
ing force, the emphasis on casting stars and ensuring production quality diminishes. 
Production volumes take precedence, production budgets get smaller, and distribu-
tion costs become almost negligible.
Online film providers use their consumer base, market power, and substantial 
cashflow to produce their own content. For instance, Amazon plans to roll out 30 
original movies a year with budgets of up to 50 million USD and to release most of 
them, including “date-night” and specialist horror films, directly on Prime Video.13 
Similarly, of Netflix’s intended yearly output of 55 movies per year, 35 have budgets 
of up to 20 million USD, with a majority (75%) consisting in genre movies designed 
to appeal to hyper-segmented target consumers14 whose profiles are primarily deter-
mined using advanced data analytics.15 Online streaming services occasionally cast 
movie stars in their higher budget films or shows—essentially to increase visibility 
and attract more subscribers.
Online film providers also transact business with studios on their own terms. 
Apple and “Moonlight” (2016) and “Ladybird” (2017) producer A24,16 Amazon and 
“The Purge” (2013) producer Blumhouse,17 and Netflix and Paramount Pictures18 
recently struck production deals. In a twist on the studios’ commitment logic, Ama-
zon and Netflix intend to offer limited theatrical release to those films most likely to 
get high-profile nominations and awards, which in turn serve to incentivize promi-
nent filmmakers to work with them and bestow prestige on the service, thus increas-
ing its awareness among potential new subscribers and, therefore, generating more 
12 Barnes, B. (2019). In the Shadow of Blockbusters, Smaller Films Wilt. The New York Times, 24 11 
2019: BU1.
13 Barnes, B. (2019). Amazon Resets Its Film Operation After Rough Year at Box Office. The New York 
Times, 19 02 2019: B1.
14 Barnes, B. (2018). Netflix’s Movie Blitz Takes Aim at Hollywood’s Heart. The New York Times, 17 
12 2018: A1.
15 Adalian, J. (2018). Inside the Binge Factory. The New York Magazine, 11 06 2018.
16 Bradshaw, T. (2018). Apple strikes movie deal with Moonlight producer A24. Financial Times, 15 11 
2018, https ://www.ft.com/conte nt/c295a cb8-e91e-11e8-885c-e64da 4c0f9 81. Accessed 15 11 2018.
17 Barnes, B. (2019). Amazon Resets Its Film Operation After Rough Year at Box Office. The New York 
Times, 19 02 2019: B1.
18 Paramount Chief Executive Jim Gianopoulos’s description of the deal as a “new, incremental revenue 
stream” demonstrates the enduring prevalence of the commitment logic at the studio (in Nicolaou, A. 
(2018). Paramount Agrees Deal to Make Films for Netflix. Financial Times, 16 11 2018: https ://www.
ft.com/conte nt/ac466 e72-e999-11e8-885c-e64da 4c0f9 81. Accessed 16 11 2018.
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subscription revenue.19 Even so, as Sperling (2019) notes, “Netflix has little time 
for the old theatrical business model. It is devoted to keeping its subscribers happy, 
meaning that most of its movies make their debuts on the streaming service itself”.20
Although both Netflix and Amazon adhere to the convenience logic, their 
approaches differ. Whereas Netflix uses premium content to generate more subscrip-
tions to its streaming service and fend off competitors, Amazon uses every element 
of the Amazon Prime service, including award-winning content, to generate cross-
selling. The intention is to use Prime customers’ annual membership fee to encour-
age more browsing and purchases: as CEO Jeff Bezos explains, “when we win a 
Golden Globe, it helps us sell more shoes”.21
In the convenience logic, performance is assessed as the total number of sub-
scribers on a global portfolio rather than a film-per-film basis, and data analytics 
efforts are directed towards compelling subscribers to stay on the service longer. As 
Gomez-Uribe and Hunt (2015: 13:2) note: “… a typical Netflix member loses inter-
est after perhaps 60 to 90 s of choosing, having reviewed 10 to 20 titles (perhaps 
three in detail) on one or two screens. The user either finds something of interest 
or the risk of the user abandoning our service increases substantially. The recom-
mender problem is to make sure that on those two screens each member in our 
diverse pool will find something compelling to view, and will understand why it 
might be of interest”.22 Theatrical release is no longer a priority and is often for-
feited altogether by streaming services, unless, as previously mentioned, a limited 
scale release is deemed necessary to secure participation from highflying talent and 
gain Oscar nominations for specific movies, which in turn helps to increase the vis-
ibility of the service and the number of its subscribers.
Online content providers are mostly free from the geographic distribution con-
straints of the Hollywood studios. Thus, they can grow their business “on an enor-
mous scale…becoming a producer and distributor of shows and movies with a fully 
global reach” (Gomez-Uribe and Hunt 2015: 13:6). As of October 2019, Netflix had 
over 158 million subscribers worldwide, including 62 million in the USA,23 and in 
June 2019, Amazon Prime boasted 105 million paying members in the USA alone, 
21 Mossberg, W. (2016). Five Things I learned from Jeff Bezos at Code. The Verge, 08 06 2016, https ://
www.theve rge.com/2016/6/8/11879 684/walt-mossb erg-jeff-bezos -amazo n-blue-origi n-code-confe rence 
-2016. Accessed 02 05 2019.
22 Netflix is consequently seeking to limit password sharing, which by compromising the accuracy of 
its recommender algorithms and circumventing its business model, adds up to millions of dollars of 
unachieved income. The Independent, 18 10 2019, https ://www.indep enden t.co.uk/arts-enter tainm ent/
tv/news/netfl ix-passw ord-shari ng-accou nt-detai ls-frien ds-famil y-strea m-a9162 186.html. Accessed 19 10 
2019.
23 https ://www.stati sta.com/stati stics /25093 4/quart erly-numbe r-of-netfl ix-strea ming-subsc riber s-world 
wide/. Accessed 08 11 2019.
19 Kenigsberg, B. (2018). Netflix Put a Movie in Theatres. Good Luck Finding It. The New York Times, 
14 11 2018: B1.
20 Sperling, N. (2019). Netflix and Theatre Chains Feud Over ‘Irishman’. The New York Times, 03 11 
2019: BU, 1.
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although not all of them used Prime to stream audio-visual content.24 These num-
bers are dwarfed, however, by Apple’s 1.4 billion devices in use around the world as 
of February 2019, including over 900 million iPhones, which screens Apple TV+ is 
intent to fill with its own content and programming from partner companies. On 1 
November 2019, Apple TV+ joined a fierce battle for subscribers, or more precisely, 
for “credit card numbers, email addresses and direct access to consumers”.25 Apple 
profits from its reputation for quality and security to offer subscription packages at 
4.99 USD a month—that is, 4 USD cheaper than Netflix’s basic subscription and 
11 USD cheaper than its premium membership. Students who subscribe to Apple 
Music for 4.99 USD per month get Apple TV+ on top, and buyers of a new Apple 
device access the new service free of charge for 1 year.26
Although the convenience institutional logic is younger than the commitment 
institutional logic, it has also already spawned its own vocabularies of practice, such 
as “data analytics”, “search”, “recommender system” (that is, a collection of algo-
rithms that come together to offer bespoke viewer recommendations), “streaming”, 
“binge-watching” (a tailored viewing experience normalized by Netflix that struc-
tures its publishing and business model: Jenner 2018), and “cross-selling” (selling 
an additional product or service to an existing customer).
4  Competition, cooperation, and substitution between institutional 
logics
Institutional logics exercise considerable influence on decision-making within firms 
and across industries. However, early studies argued that when changes take place in 
the business environment, this influence may decline, with institutional logics that 
are unable to adapt to the new conditions often replaced by new ones (Thornton and 
Ocasio 1999). More recent work contends that institutional logics that run into dif-
ficulties can also evolve by assimilating new practices, by expanding or contracting 
their scope, by blending (that is, hybridizing) with other institutional logics, or by 
splitting into multiple institutional logics (Thornton et al. 2012: 164). Organizations 
may also use institutional logics as resources which they strategically incorporate or 
discard to improve their competitive position and performance within an industry. 
Thus, when a new logic emerges, and depending on their competence base, scope 
of operations, and status position, organizations can opt to persist with their original 
logic, or to embrace the new logic so as to overhaul established competitive posi-
tions by either adding or substituting it for the existing logic (Durand et al. 2013).
The institutional logics perspective presents a range of alternatives that are useful 
to analyse how the interaction between commitment and convenience may play out. 
The options discussed below do not offer a forecast. Rather, they accommodate the 
24 https ://www.stati sta.com/stati stics /54689 4/numbe r-of-amazo n-prime -payin g-membe rs/. Accessed 08 
11 2019.
25 Lee, E. (2019). Netflix Out as Apple Ramps Up Programs. The New York Times, 25 03 2019: B1.
26 https ://www.digit altre nds.com/apple /what-is-apple -tv-plus/, 01 11 2019. Accessed 08 11 2019.
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uncertainty of the decisions and actions of the studios, online streaming services, 
and other key stakeholders in the face of a rapidly changing environment. Such 
uncertainty makes knowing for sure what will happen impossible. Even so, we can 
flesh out possible scenarios by constructing alternative combinations between the 
two logics, and the strategic moves that they entail for the Hollywood studios and 
online streaming services. Figure 1 presents a matrix of four such scenarios.
4.1  Commitment logic dominant
In this first scenario, the commitment and convenience logics still coexist; however, 
the former dominates the latter (Nigam and Ocasio 2010). The extreme risk associ-
ated with wide theatrical release is perceived as an asset rather than a liability, and 
unbounded risk (infinite variance) arises from the upside potential of a motion pic-
ture’s revenues (De Vany and Walls 2004). Traditional studios and exhibitors strive 
to improve the experience of going out to watch a movie in a cinema: the first by 
increasing the level of excitement associated with blockbuster movies combining 
marquee talent, heavy marketing, and a wide opening (Elberse 2013), and the sec-
ond, by enhancing the comfort of the seats and the quality of the sound, image, and 
food and drinks available in cinemas. In many ways, scenario 1 is the alternative 
with the highest uncertainty associated with success, as it perpetuates the high cost 
strategy of releasing films in cinemas by still aiming for high returns in a market-
place exceedingly skewed towards a very small number of blockbusters (De Vany 
and Walls 2004; Walls 2013) hailing from increasingly consolidated studios.
In scenario 1, the online streaming services continue to use data-driven analyt-
ics to micro-segment their offerings and produce and broadcast niche content that 
is narrowly marketed to specific audiences. Just like independent film third-party 
Fig. 1  Institutional logics scenario matrix
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finance changes the entire distribution of film earnings by reducing both the prob-
ability of losses and of high returns (Rusco and Walls 2004), and the online stream-
ing services focus primarily on episodic content that provides a low-variance flow 
of revenues, thereby reducing the risk of losses along with the prospect of extremely 
large profits. They consequently end up competing for content and viewers with dig-
ital television channels, rather than with Hollywood studios.
In contrast, the traditional studios increasingly focus on the production and dis-
tribution of a few tentpole blockbusters a year, and enjoy robust earnings through a 
combination of technological evolution (for instance, virtual or augmented reality), 
marketing savvy, and institutional knowledge. Occasional large successes and studio 
mergers provide the critical mass and resources needed to pursue this logic. In sce-
nario 1, Hollywood studios continue to use streaming services, including their own, 
as one of many channels for their films, with a significant delay between theatrical 
release and online streaming. Studios may also renew or develop partnerships with 
start-ups that operate under the commitment logic, for instance Red Carpet Home 
Cinema, which allows 36-h movie rentals upon release for 1500–3000 USD per 
film.27
Scenario 1 prolongs the commitment logic that currently prevails within the tra-
ditional Hollywood studios by expanding its scope at the expense of the convenience 
logic. It is manifest, for instance, in the closing down or streamlining of many major 
studio specialist divisions and in the steady decrease in original and art house pro-
ductions to focus on blockbuster franchises, sequels, and adaptations.
4.2  Committed convenience logic
When two institutional logics interact, one can absorb the key elements of the other, 
leading to a “blending” of the two (Glynn and Lounsbury 2005). In our second 
scenario of “committed convenience”, the studios fully embrace data analytics to 
produce a varied portfolio of audio-visual content which they either still tradition-
ally distribute using a blockbuster strategy or digitally stream without a theatrical 
release. Meanwhile, online streaming services multiply their forays into cinemas, 
and end up also adopting a blended approach of production and theatrical distri-
bution of tentpole blockbusters and of production and online streaming of episodic 
content and small and mid-budget movies.
Traditional studios dominate in the committed convenience logic, primarily 
because they can integrate into streaming more easily than online firms can diversify 
into blockbuster production. They do so either by developing a streaming platform 
organically and relying on the appeal of their existing film catalogue to build critical 
mass, or by acquiring the catalogue and technology of an existing streaming service. 
Scenario 2 allows traditional studios to leverage their legacy deals and relationships 
to talent, technical services, and exhibitors to continue to pursue a traditional block-
buster strategy in movie theatres, while simultaneously adopting the uncertainty 
27 Barnes, B. (2019). $3,000 to Rent a Movie? Bringing the Theater Home for the 1%. The New York 
Times, 08 04 2019: B1.
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reduction techniques of data analytics and boutique offerings which online provid-
ers favour. To stay relevant and embrace the disruption caused by online stream-
ing, some studios may therefore become “reinvented incumbents” that use “many 
of their established advantages of scale and access to capital to achieve greater eco-
nomic returns compared with their traditional counterparts”.28
We see elements of this scenario in progress, for instance, within Walt Disney 
Studios—21st Century Fox, which are simultaneously heavily investing in tradi-
tional tentpole blockbusters such as Anthony and Joe Russo’s 2019 “Avengers: End-
game” and operating the new “Disney+” online streaming platform. The latter was 
launched with considerable cross-promotional clout29 on 12 November 2019 for 
6.99 USD per month (it is free for 1 year to Verizon unlimited phone plan subscrib-
ers) to complement Disney-owned Hulu,30 which may also pivot to more mature 
content moving forward.31 Disney+ signed in 10 million subscribers in its launch 
week.32 WarnerMedia and NBCUniversal are also developing proprietary stream-
ing services, which they intend to launch in 2020.33 All are actively reclaiming their 
copyrighted content from existing online services to offer it exclusively on their up-
and-coming platforms.34
4.3  Convenience logic dominant
Scenario 3 offers a reversal of scenario 1, with a similar process leading one insti-
tutional logic to expand at the expense of the other. Here, however, the convenience 
logic comes to dominate the commitment logic. As the prominence of traditional 
studios wanes and the requirement of theatrical distribution disappears, convenience 
becomes the dominant logic. Online streaming services are able to provide sustain-
able low-variance returns on boutique content through the use of data analytics and 
recommender systems (Gomez-Uribe and Hunt 2015). Already lower uncertainty 
for online providers is further decreased as they collect more data and improve 
their artificial intelligence algorithms and as more people migrate online, leading 
28 Pacthod, D., Sneader, K. & Swaminathan, A. (2018). Why Legacy Companies Must Reinvent—or 
Die. Fortune, 24 09 2018, http://fortu ne.com/2018/09/24/busin ess-strat egy-techn ology -mckin sey/. 
Accessed 05 05 2019.
29 Barnes, B. (2019). Disney is New to Streaming, but its Marketing is Unmatched. The New York Times, 
27 10 2019, https ://www.nytim es.com/2019/10/27/busin ess/media /disne y-plus-marke ting.html. Accessed 
09 11 2019.
30 Disis, J. (2019). Disney is Taking Full Control of Hulu. CNN Business, 14 05 2019, https ://editi 
on.cnn.com/2019/05/14/media /disne y-buys-comca st-hulu-owner ship/index .html. Accessed 18 05 2019.
31 Gartenberg, C. (2019). AT&T May Have Just Signaled the End of Hulu as You Know It Today. The 
Verge, 15 04 2019, https ://www.theve rge.com/2019/4/15/18312 068/disne y-hulu-att-sells -stake -comca st-
contr ol-strea ming. Accessed 02 05 2019.
32 Swisher, K. (2019). Disney Channels the Force. New York Times, 15 11 2019, https ://www.nytim 
es.com/2019/11/15/opini on/disne y-plus-strea ming-netfl ix.html. Accessed 28 11 2019.
33 Nicolaou, A. & Fei, F. (2019). Netflix: How Will the Story End? Financial Times, 18 09 2019, https ://
ig.ft.com/netfl ix-futur e/. Accessed 08 11 2019.
34 Bode, K. (2019). The Worst May Be Yet to Come for Netflix. OneZero Medium, 26 07 2019, https 
://oneze ro.mediu m.com/the-worst -may-be-yet-to-come-for-netfl ix-2a429 ed9c4 f6. Accessed 30 07 2019.
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to the positive feedback loops generally referred to as data network effects or “data 
flywheel”.35
An extreme version of scenario 3 may see the disappearance of movie thea-
tres, and the replacement of what would become outdated film festivals and film 
awards with new status markers and more encompassing selection systems incorpo-
rating feature films and episodic shows. In a more conservative convenience logic 
dominant scenario, online streaming services would still engage in a few theatri-
cal releases, perceived as prerequisites to creating or signalling status markers and 
to gaining industry prestige (Durand and Hadida 2016; Webster and Hysom 1998). 
Both Amazon Studios and Netflix have experimented with theatrical release, and 
both have mostly done so to create awareness for their movies, to qualify for awards, 
and to court filmmakers whose preferred release channel remains the big screen.36 
Moving forward, they may use their capabilities and competitive advantage in data 
analytics to harness the knowledge from these initial experiments and make theatri-
cal release a more standard part of their go-to-market strategy.
A plausible development under the convenience logic dominant scenario would 
therefore see online streaming services integrate downstream into cinemas to 
decrease the cost of theatrical distribution. Accordingly, Amazon and Netflix were 
both in the running in 2018 to acquire Landmark, an independent and foreign film 
focused movie chain operating over 50 cinemas in the USA.37 Netflix also took over 
the lease of historic “Paris” movie theatre in New York City in November 2019 and 
will use it to showcase some of its most prestigious films, starting with Noah Baum-
bach’s 2019 “Marriage Story”.38
In scenario 3, a consolidation of digital streaming services is also possible. For 
instance, Apple may purchase Netflix, which had amassed by the end of 2018 over 
29 billion USD in debt and obligations to finance its growth and committed addi-
tional spending of 2–5 billion USD over the next 5 years,39 to accelerate its plan to 
create original content and to get access to Netflix’s growing international catalogue 
of bespoke audio-visual properties.40 Similarly, Apple or Amazon may also use their 
cash reserves to purchase one Hollywood studio, for instance Paramount Pictures, 
35 https ://www.cbins ights .com/resea rch/team-blog/data-netwo rk-effec ts/. Accessed 23 01 2019.
36 Fithian, J. (2019). A Way for Netflix to Add to its Bottom Line: Include Theatres in the Mix. Vari-
ety, 11 01 2019, https ://varie ty.com/2019/film/news/netfl ix-add-theat ers-john-fithi an-nato-12031 06077 /. 
Accessed 02 05 2019.
37 Musil, S. (2018). Netflix Has Reportedly Considered Buying Movie Theaters. CNet, 19 04 2018, https 
://www.cnet.com/news/netfl ix-has-repor tedly -consi dered -buyin g-movie -theat ers/. Accessed 19 11 2018; 
Sakoui, A., Ahmed, N. & Soper, S. (2018). Amazon in Running to Acquire Landmark Movie Chain. 
Bloomberg, 16 08 2018, https ://www.bloom berg.com/news/artic les/2018-08-16/amazo n-is-said-to-be-in-
runni ng-to-acqui re-landm ark-movie -chain . Accessed 19 11 2018.
38 https ://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/26/netfl ix-takes -over-new-yorks -paris -theat er-for-movie -scree nings 
.html. Accessed 20 12 2019.
39 Nicolaou, A. & Fei, F. (2019). Netflix: How Will the Story End? Financial Times, 18 09 2019, https ://
ig.ft.com/netfl ix-futur e/. Accessed 08 11 2019.
40 Rocco, M. (2019). Apple Should Buy Netflix, Sonos or Activision Blizzard, JPMorgan Says. Finan-
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then liquidate or integrate most of its production facilities to focus on exploiting its 
film catalogue.
4.4  Conveniently committed logic
The fourth and last scenario, “conveniently committed”, is one in which both the 
commitment and the convenience institutional logics are challenged. Scenario 4 is 
based on considering the possibility of a transformation in the industry that leads 
to the emergence of a novel institutional logic that ultimately replaces existing ones 
(Rao, Monin, and Durand 2005).
Traditional studios did not anticipate the advent of the convenience logic. Par-
amount Pictures was reported as “[missing] internet opportunities at nearly every 
turn” in the 25 years since Viacom acquired the studio in 1994.41 In 2010, the then 
Time Warner Chief Executive Jeffrey L. Bewkes famously underestimated the threat 
posed by Netflix, which he described in the following terms: “It’s a little bit like, 
is the Albanian army going to take over the world? I don’t think so”.42 Arguably, 
Time Warner was also reluctant to jeopardize the lucrative multi-billion-dollar rela-
tionship with cable networks by “charging into the streaming fray”.43 By early 2020 
though, 46 million consumers, or one in five adults in the USA, have cancelled their 
pay-tv subscription.44 Just as the traditional studios did not foresee the challenge 
from streaming services, the emergence of a new, yet to appear logic may similarly 
blindside both extant traditional studios and online streaming services.
In scenario 4, online streaming services may find that intermittent binge con-
sumption and low switching costs between online streaming services prevent them 
from retaining subscribers for substantial periods of time. Digital television chan-
nels and other forms of online entertainment may exacerbate the instability of their 
subscriber base. At the same time, the studios may continue to struggle with an 
increased prevalence of film viewing ATAWAD by consumers on their own or in 
small groups. This may lead traditional studios to conclude that continuing to pursue 
blockbuster strategies driven by theatrical exhibition has become unsustainable.
A new institutional logic radically different from both commitment and con-
venience may therefore emerge. Part of the challenge both institutional logics face 
comes from the changing nature of content consumption. The shared, communal 
experience of watching a film in the darkness of a movie theatre surrounded by 
strangers has long defined cinema and has long been a unique value proposition of 
the commitment logic. Enjoying filmed entertainment in the privacy of one’s home 
removes an important part of this experience. The consequences can be significant. 
41 Chozick, A. & Barnes, B. (2019). Hollywood’s Mountain, Now a Molehill. The New York Times, 20 
01 2019: BU1.
42 Arango, T. (2010). Time Warner Views Netflix as a Fading Star. The New York Times, 13 12 2010: 
B1.
43 Barnes, B. (2019). The Streaming Era Has Finally Arrived. Everything Is About to Change. The New 
York Times, 01 12 2019: F3.
44 Barnes, B. (2019). Disney Debut Shows Streaming’s Force. The New York Times, 11 11 2019: B1.
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The emergence of television broadcasting in the 1950s resulted in a shift in audience 
demographics and a sharp decline in the average age of regular moviegoers (Gil and 
Spiller 2007; Segrave 1999). The cohort of young people that drove cinema attend-
ance prior to online streaming is now coming of age in an environment where con-
suming recorded entertainment whenever, wherever, and on any device has become 
the norm.
The emergence of contemporaneous mass viewing without physical co-presence 
is particularly significant in scenario 4. Large numbers of individuals can now view 
the same program on hand-held devices simultaneously in different locations, and 
submit themselves to a shared experience that previously could only be provided 
in cinemas or by inviting friends to watch content together at home. By engaging 
with social media and online forums, viewers can now watch content and share com-
ments online in real time with friends, acquaintances, and complete strangers. Tech-
nological developments such as augmented reality may hasten and enhance such 
occurrences.
We therefore foresee an evolution of viewer preferences for streamed content 
on hand-held screens as a plausible and acceptable substitute for theatrical view-
ing. In scenario 4, new online business models as well as platforms providing the 
functionalities and experiences of existing services as part of their own expanded 
offerings (Eisenmann et al. 2011) may emerge and supplant both traditional studios 
and online streaming services. More revolutionary developments under scenario 4 
could also make film production and consumption obsolete. Contemplating one such 
radical scenario, Netflix’s co-founder and CEO Reed Hastings goes as far as to say: 
“I worry about a pharmaceutical company inventing a pill providing better entertain-
ment than our movies. Substitutions like this or the misuse of AI could change our 
markets and behaviour—for the worse”.45
5  Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we identified two institutional logics at play in the current filmmak-
ing ecosystem: the traditional logic of commitment developed and implemented by 
the five major Hollywood studios, and a new, emergent logic of convenience spear-
headed by Netflix, Amazon Studios, and other online streaming services. We set out 
to review these two logics and define their key features, before exploring four alter-
native scenarios aimed at illustrating how competition, cooperation, or co-opetition 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996) between the two institutional logics, one estab-
lished and the other new, may develop in the near future.
The institutional logics approach, which serves as the theoretical underpin-
nings of our research, is strongly socio-cognitive in nature. As previously stated, 
it argues that the attention and the decision-making criteria and actions of manag-
ers and organizations are partly determined by the institutional logic under which 
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they operate. The traditional studios’ institutional logic of commitment rests on a 
dynamic interaction between executives who are primarily focused on production 
and executives strongly oriented towards distribution. Such interaction provides 
both the cognitive framing and the legitimation of the arguments put forward in our 
discussion.
Our research brings a clear institutional logics focus to the drive to identify the 
rationales underlying strategic processes and decisions and eliciting the development 
of competitive advantage (Regnér 2005). We also offer the first institutional logics 
framing of the rivalry between traditional studios and online streaming services. 
Applied to the film industry, the institutional logics perspective differs markedly 
from prior approaches taken in the economics (Moul 2005; Vogel 2014), finance 
(Rusco and Walls 2004), and marketing (Elberse and Eliashberg 2003) literature. 
Just like most quantitative studies of other cultural products including books, music, 
and games (see, for instance, the numerous studies cited and discussed in Hennig-
Thureau and Houston 2019), nearly all quantitative research on the movie business 
so far has focused on project-level analyses of the correlates of film profitability. 
It has consequently derived managerial implications specific to the production and 
distribution of individual films, such as the use of marquee talent or promotional 
activity. While this line of research provides useful normative guidance for the pro-
duction and distribution of individual titles, it may not be particularly helpful in 
guiding the stream of decisions that studios have to make in their role as major hubs 
of financing, production, and distribution of feature films. Our approach provides an 
overview that is consistent with this strategic task.
This article is also the first, to the best of our knowledge, to combine institutional 
logics with scenario analysis. At this stage however, our effort very much focuses on 
analysing existing industry conditions. A deeper analysis could involve, for instance, 
identifying and expanding on some of the factors that could push specific organiza-
tions or the overall industry towards each of the scenarios. While a thorough analy-
sis of these factors and of the likely results of their combination is beyond the scope 
of the current article, three of them deserve particular attention.
First, as streaming services keep growing and consolidating, anti-trust regulations 
may lead governments in certain jurisdictions to argue that they represent a monop-
sony power that needs to be curtailed, for the benefit of consumers and of their own 
domestic film industries. Such a development would favour scenario 2. Second, 
digital privacy concerns may lead legislators to place limits on the right of stream-
ing services to use recommender systems that rely on user generated data. Regula-
tions that require streaming services to obtain consent from consumers for the use of 
viewing data will reduce the predictive power of recommender systems that is cur-
rently central to the streaming services’ convenience logic. Such conditions would 
favour scenario 1. Third, changing consumer habits may lead to a radical redefini-
tion of the current movie theatre landscape. Cinema attendance has been decreas-
ing steadily and is now at an all-time low (MPAA 2019). Outside emerging markets 
such as China and India, exhibition revenues have been strong primarily because 
ticket prices have risen sharply. Should the decline in attendance continue, moviego-
ing may entail discretionary spending comparable to that of live theatre attendance. 
Film exhibition may become at best a niche business (Baumol and Bowen 1966), 
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as the current multiplex exhibition system loses economic viability, leading many 
exhibitors to exit the industry. In such conditions, the standard studio distribution 
model that relies on theatrical release would become unsustainable. Scenario 3 or 
scenario 4 would then be favoured.
Additional considerations and modelling of the risks and rewards involved with 
each of the four scenarios and an empirical assessment of the cost-to-benefit ratio 
associated with them could also expand the current research. Another follow-up 
study could consist of a more detailed analysis of the decisions taken by specific 
studios and streaming services in the light of the four proposed scenarios, and of the 
impact of their actions on performance and competitiveness. A study of how people 
and organizations deal with the institutional changes implied by the four scenarios, 
focusing in particular on resistance to change and lock-in, would also provide inter-
esting material for a qualitative case study.
Focusing on Hollywood inevitably means that we have essentially adopted a 
US-centric approach. It is important to note that institutional logics are historically 
contingent and vary over time and across geographies (Friedland and Alford 1991; 
Haveman and Gualtieri 2017). It would therefore be interesting to test whether the 
same approach can be used to analyse other national film industries with different 
distributions of power among social actors, technologies in use, and performance 
metrics. For instance, further research could examine whether the approach outlined 
in this article applies to China or the European Union, which confront the challenge 
of online streaming without a powerful integrated studio system in place.
Management research tends to use historical data to explain the contours of 
today’s business. Our article does not have this luxury: the motion picture industry 
is in flux. Reports of strategic moves from either side of the institutional logics spec-
trum hit the news almost daily, and Hollywood studios’ revenues are affected by two 
loop effects: they simultaneously compete with the disruptive business models of 
the streaming services and create more intense competition with each other (Bughin 
and van Zeebroeck 2017). Our article therefore explores potential trajectories, with-
out concluding which of them will be realized.
Even so, our analysis does lead to the following recommendations. The main nor-
mative implication for managers is to view the industry through the lens of insti-
tutional logics. Decision-makers within studios and streaming services need to be 
cognizant of changes in institutional logics and organizing practices. The move from 
individual product pricing to subscription has also affected exhibitors, with apps 
such as MoviePass challenging existing models. Over time, we can expect more 
such innovative challengers attempting to disrupt the existing order.
Second, irrespective of the dominant institutional logic, data analytics are likely 
to be key drivers in the evolution of the film industry. Online streaming services are 
fairly advanced in their use of analytics, while traditional studios seem to be play-
ing catch up. The institutional logics perspective points to organizations potentially 
becoming more similar in time, for instance through the mobility of human capital 
among them. Online streaming services regularly hire traditional media executives. 
Among them, former president of entertainment at NBCUniversal Jennifer Salke 
joined Amazon in February 2018 to oversee its studio business, and former chief 
creative officer of UK’s Channel 4 Jay Hunt joined Apple in October 2017 to head 
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the firm’s worldwide video operations. Likewise, expanding their recruitment and 
promotion policies to a new class of managers who understand and relate to the con-
venience institutional logic and empowering them to make decisions may help tradi-
tional studios advance their understanding and perception of this latter logic. It may 
also help them make pertinent decisions relative to what data analytics capabilities 
they need to develop, and what resources they need to invest to do so.
Third, all players, but especially streaming services, should closely monitor new 
technological developments. Since the success of the latter is largely based on changing 
consumer habits due to technology (for instance, ubiquity of broadband access, rapid 
growth in hand-held devices, and the social connectivity from Internet 2.0), it makes 
them more vulnerable to newer technologies, and therefore potential competitors or 
substitutes, than traditional studios. Augmented reality may soon provide theatre-level 
visual experiences from the comfort of one’s home, while also allowing simultaneous 
social connectivity across multiple physical locations.
The four scenarios developed in this article are intended to help all players deline-
ate and inform their next strategic moves. Our hope is that industry experts find them 
useful standpoints for their analyses, at a time when the perception that “nobody 
knows anything” in the film business (Goldman 1983) may be stronger than ever.
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Appendix: A brief historical overview of the commitment 
institutional logic
The expansion of fixed “nickelodeon” movie theatres between 1905 and 1907 led to 
the take-off of cinema as a legitimate industry (Musser 1990) and to the emergence 
of the commitment institutional logic. It coincided with a significant increase in film 
production and the development of distribution as a special activity often managed 
by large film production companies (Bakker 2007).
By the end of the 1920s, longer feature films were shown in comfortable “movie 
palaces”, with talking movies becoming mainstream after the release of Alan 
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Crosland’s “The Jazz Singer” in 1927. Up until the early 1950s, studios made 
as many as fifty movies a year each, with audiences to match. Two major exter-
nal shocks caused the end of this “golden age” (Gomery 1986), and the ensuing 
strengthening of the commitment logic. First, the 1948 anti-trust Paramount Decrees 
led to a separation of exhibition from production and distribution and to the prohi-
bition of many of the standard trade practices of the day, including block booking, 
blind bidding, and master licence agreements, that contractually guaranteed theatre 
screens for a studio’s entire annual slate.46 Signatories to the Decrees—Paramount, 
Loew’s (MGM), Warner Bros., 20th Century Fox, RKO Pictures, Universal Studios, 
and United Artists—divested from their theatrical assets and abandoned a portfolio 
approach to development and sales, opting instead for a film-by-film approach. Sec-
ond, the surge of television—from 14,000 sets in 1947 to covering almost 90% of 
US households by the end of the 1950s—led to an increase in demand for quality 
content.
By the 1960s, studios had embraced television as a viable outlet for their movies. 
By shifting their mass production efforts into episodic television and lower-quality 
“made-for-television” movies, they were also able to reorganize their operations, 
maintain term contracts with talent and technicians, and sustain their dominance of 
the film industry (Anderson 2013). In parallel, studios moved to produce and distrib-
ute smaller numbers of higher-quality big budget movies to keep drawing audiences 
to the movie theatres. They reduced their slates of feature films produced in-house, 
engaged more in co-productions, and invested in new technologies such as colour and 
stereophonic sound (Gil and Spiller 2007). Accordingly, they also completed their 
shift to assessing performance on a film-per-film basis, mostly as theatrical revenue 
(Hadida 2009) and Oscar nominations and awards (Ginsburgh and Weyers 1999).
The advent and rapid growth of television in the 1950s and 1960s allowed audi-
ences to watch movies at home (Segrave 1999). The studios, however, refrained 
from showing their best films on television and supplied television channels essen-
tially with lower-quality products (Anderson 2013). The expediency of linear televi-
sion was also considerably constrained by programming schedules, and even after 
the advent of home video recording and viewing and of time-shifting, the consump-
tion of broadcast content was limited to one device only: the television set.
The modern era began in earnest with Steven Spielberg’s 1975 “Jaws” and 1977 
“Close Encounters of the Third Kind”, and with George Lucas’s 1977 “Star Wars”. 
After the success of these widely released and heavily promoted films, studios pri-
oritized the search for “blockbusters”—that is, films that were likely to capture the 
lion share of potential audiences when released into cinemas (Gomery 2003). Block-
busters were increasingly regarded as hedge against films that were risky in terms of 
box-office performance, either because they dealt with unusual subjects or because 
they lacked familiar stars. Nowadays, most films barely breakeven. Revenues flow 
to a few blockbusters, and average box-office returns are dominated by extreme out-
comes (Walls 2005, 2013).
46 https ://supre me.justi a.com/cases /feder al/us/334/131/. Accessed 03 01 2019.
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This state of affairs is frequently criticized, with regular calls for Hollywood to 
turn back the clock and reject the constant search for blockbusters (Puttnam 1997), 
and franchise movies, which according to Academy Award winner Martin Scorsese, 
are lacking in “revelation, mystery or genuine emotional danger. Nothing is at risk. 
The pictures […] are sequels in name but they are remakes in spirit, and everything 
in them is officially sanctioned because it can’t really be any other way. That’s the 
nature of modern film franchises: market-researched, audience-tested, vetted, modi-
fied, revetted and remodified until they’re ready for consumption”.47 Most of these 
calls, however, have been ignored: Paradoxically, the skewed distribution of box-
office performance has merely served to reinforce the commitment institutional 
logic.
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